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estimate,  particularly  in developing  countries.  private  sector  appears  to  be  a more  realistic
Shafik  presents  a model  of  the  determinants  of  proxy.
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Firms'  decisions  about  investment  are  spurious  regression.;  and  to estimate  the  long-run
outcomes  of  the  oligopolistic  structure  of' mar-  equilibrium  relationship  between  investment  and
kets,  putty-clay  technology,  the  inelastic  supply  its  determinants.
of  nontraded  capital  goods,  and  financial  repres-
sion.  These  factors  resulh  in an  importait  role  She  discisses  thv  limit  of'testing
l'or markups,  interTal  finanicing,  demand,  andl tYie  econometricldly  whe  her  thc  govemment
cost  of  investment  goods  --  defined,  not  as the  "cro\wids  in"  or  "cro"ws  out"  private  investment
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of' investmrn,t  goods,  it is possible  to pros  i(le a  a1bout \N  hat  did  nlot happen  (the  null  hypothesis).
more  meaningful  indicator  of' the true  cost  of'
capital  to the  firm  under  a repressed  finiancial  'I'Tle model  also  provides  a framework  for
svstem.  In an econonmy with a well-functionlint  nalyzing  tie  cffects of,zovernment  policy  by
credit  market,  the  Keyncsian  equilibrium  condii-  considering  explicitly  thlc role  of  a number  of
tion  equating  the  marginal  efficiency  ol'inxcst-  possible  instrumalnts  suchi as the  exchange  rate,
ment  with  the  interest  is likely  to  hoid.  But  tItIe  quantity  of  credit  ava  lable  to  the  private
under  financial  repression  or  ihere  credit  sector,  and  the  composition  and  financing  of' the
markets  are  impcrfcct,  ltlC  interest  rate  is not  a  governiminlt  budget.  Future  research  may  choose
true  reflectioni  of  the  cost  of  capital  to tie  firm.  to test  otiher cmpiricail  pro  ies,  such  as protec-
Instead,  a Lombinlatioln  of' the  price  of  investenict  tioiI,  w,%ilitin  Ihie same  fram  \work.
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1. Introduction:  Thi, issues
1.1. Intrdugtion
The economic literatwire  on investment has been characterized by considerable controversy,
even by  the standards  of  economists.  A number of  different,  often overlapping,  models of
investment determination have been hypothesized and the empirical evidence has done little  to
clarify which, if any, are accurate representations of the way in which capital formation occurs
in  the economy.  This is  particularly  true for developing countries where there has been less
empirical work, the data are less reliable, and the appropriateness of existing theoretical models
is debatable.
It is against this background that this paper suggests some methodological innovations in
modelling aggregate investment behavior.  A theoretical  framework for  analyzing investment
decisions is presented in Section 2 that  takes into account some of the structural  features of a
developing economy.  Starting from the firm's  optimization problem, an  aggregate investment
function is derived Lhat reflects the results of a survey of decision-making in fifty private sector
firms in  Egypt.  The mo&ol  is then tested at the macroeconomic level in Section 3 using new
econometric techniques that  have emerged in  the recent literature  on stationarity  testing and
cointegration.  The relationship  between investment and  an  array  of government policies  is
highlighted in the economnetric  analysis. The conclusions, both methodological and empirical, are
presented in Section 4.- 3 .
1.2.  Background: The Literature  on Investment  in Developing  Countries
Since there are a  number of  good surveys of the  investment literature  available,'  this
section focuses on empirical models that are relevant to developing countries.  The relatively few
attempts to  estimate investment functions for developing economies have tended to  use fairly
eclectic models that  combine features of the flexible accelerator, neoclassical, and structuralist
approaches.  Few studies have attempted to apply "q" models, which use the ratio of the tnarket
valuation of the existing capital stock to its replacement  cost, to developing countries since stock
market valuations of corporate fixed assets are often non-existent or else are not meaninigful. 2
A  number  of  these  studies,  particul  iy  the  country-specific  ones,  have  provided
considerable insights into the factors that  influence capital formation in developing countries.
For example, Behrman's work on Chile explores the validity of putty-putty  versus putty-clay
assumptions across a number of d.:fferent  economic sectors. 3 His results revealed that investment
functions tended to differ across sectors, both in terms of the variables that were relevant and in
'See Serven and  Solimano, 1989; Precious,  1987; Bruaker,  1985; Nickell, 1978; Helliwell, 1976; Rowley and
Trivedi,  1975; and  Meyer and  Kuh,  1957.  The accelerator  and  flexible accelerator  models  are  described  in
Samuelson, 1939; Eisner,  1960; Meyer and  Glauber,  1964; Brown, Solow, Ando and Karenken,  1963; and  Eisner,
1967.  The neoclassical model originates in the work of Jorgenson,  1963; Jorgenson, 1967;  Jorgenson and Siebert,
1968;  and Hall and Jorgenson,  1971. The "Q"  theory of investment and the related adjustment costs literature  are
presented in Tobin, 1967;  ToDin, 1969;  Tobin and Brainard, 1977;  Hayashi, 1982. Modern versions of Keynes' model
based on the  supply of  capital goods can be  found  in Haavelmo, 1960; Witte,  1963; and  Precious,  1987.  The
Kaleckian profits model of investment determination is described in Kalecki, 1971.  An example of a structuralist
model of investment behavior is provided in Taylor,  1987.  Disequilibrium models of investment are described in
Malinvaud, 1980;  Malinvaud, 1982;  and Sneessens, 1987. Investment models that  focus on financial constraints  can
be found in Fazzari and  Mott,  1984;  Fazzari,  Hubbard and Peterson, 1988a; and  Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson,
1988b.
2For example, in many developing country stock market shares are not truly traded  so that  quoted prices do
not reflect the market valuation and expectations of future profitability.  Dailami uses "q" models to explain private
investment in Brazil and  Korea.  Dai!ami,  1987, 1990.  Solimano applies  a 'q'  model to Chile, but  also adds  a
number of additional explanatory variables.  Solimano, 1989.
3Behrman, 1972.-4-
terms of their  lag structure.  Pinell-Siles'  .Ady  of private  investment in  India highlights the
dampening effect that  the tax system has on capital formation because of the ,ailure  to adjust
taxable income for inflation. 4 Using panel data on Colombian firms, Bilsborrow found that the
availability of foreign exchange to implement planned capital formation and the internal flow of
funds were the most important determinants of investment. 5 The importance of cash flow effects
reflect the uncertainty, informational constraints, and weak capital markets faced by Colombian
entrepreneurs.'
These earlier studies by Behrman, Bilsborrow, and Pinell-Siles were followed by a number
of  more  ambitious  multi-country  analyses that  highlighted  the  role  of  government policy,
particularly  public  investment, on  private  capitdl  formation  in  developing economies. 7 The
theoretical framework adopted was sometimes ad hoc or some combination of neoclassical and
flexible accelerator models with additional variables to capture the effects of government policies.
Fry estimated investment functions for  sixty-one developing countries using  demand, relative
prices, the exchange rate, and the availability of domestic credit. 8 His estimates find significant
effects on  the  investment ratio  from  the growth rate  of  GDP, the  ratio  of  foreign exchange
receipts to GDP, the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, the purchasing power of exports, the ratio
of actual to expected prices, and the lagged investment ratio.  Tun Wai and Wong's estimates of
4Pinell-Siles,  1979.
5Billsborrow- 1977.
'More  recent work by Dailami on Colombia found that the high real marginal cost  of capital,  especially for
small- and medium-size firrs,  served to constrain the expansion of capacity in the private sector.  Dailarni, 1989.
7Fry,  1980;  Sundararajan  and Thakur,  1980;  Tun Wai and Wong, 1982; Blejer and Khan,  1984.
aFry, 1980.- 5 -
private investment functions for five courtries  used government investment, the change in bank
credit to the private sector, and the inflow of foreign capital to the private sector as explanatory
variables.9 The econometric results indicated that government investment was the most important
explanatory  variable  for  Greece, Korea,  and  Malaysia,  whereas bank  credit  was critical  in
Thailand and foreign capital inflow in Mexico. Retained earnings were included in the regressions
for Greece and Korea,  the only countries for which data  were available, but  had insignificant
coefficients.
Private investment functions were estimated by Sundararajan  and  Thakur as part of  a
growth model intended to measure the effects of public investment in India and  Korea.'0 They
use a combined neoclassical and flexible accelerator model with additional terms for the public
sector capital stock  and real savings available to  the private sector."  They found significant
coefficients on all the variables for India and Korea except for the public sector capital stock
When the long run multipliers for public investment were calculatc  the effects for India and
Korea were strikingly different.  For  India, the effect of public investment on private  capital
formation was weak because of an initial strong crowding out effect that was not offset for many
periods.  These negative effects were attributed to the high incremental capital-output ratio in the
public sector in  India.  In  Korea,  they found that  the effect of public capital  formatiou  on
private investrent  was unambiguously positive in the short and long run.1 2
'Tun  Wai and Wong, 1982.
'  Sundararajan and Thakur,  1980.
"Real  savings available to the private sector was defined as total savings mninus  public investment in real terms.
'2For  an  analysis  of  the  impact  of  stock  markets  on  private  investment  in Korea,  see Dailarai,  1990.- 6  -
Blejer and Khan's paper is one of the few that uses an optimizing framework for the firim
to derive an aggregate investment function to evaluate the effects of government policy."  The
resultiug model is essentially a flexible accelerator that allows for government policy to affect the
speed  of  adjustment  to  the  desircd  capital  stock  through  a  standard  partial  adjustment
mechanism.  "  Blejer and Khan hypothesize that the factors that  affect the speed of adjustment
to desired levels of capital are the stage of the business cycle, the availablity of financing, and
the level of public sector investment.  They argue that  it  is important to  distinguish between
public investment in infrastructulre, which is more likely to "crowd in" private investment, from
that  in  other  areas.  However, the empirical testing  of  this  distinction is  weakened by the
empirical proxies used for infrastructure investment.' 5 Their empirical results from twenty-four
developing countries found an important positive effect on private investment from the degree of
capacity utilization and the availability of credit.  They also claim evidence in support of their
1  Blejer and Khan, 1984.
14 Note that thlere  are problems  with such  an approach  that stem  from the deficiencies  of the standard
partial adjustment  model. Under partial adjustment,  agents  incur costs for any kind of change,  even a
desirable  one.  Consequently,  in a growth  situation, the model results in consistent  undershooting  of the
desired  capital stock. It is possible  to address  this by using  a generalized  version  of the partial adjustment
model, the error correction  model,  that will be described  later.  See Nickell, 1985.
i  Blejer  and Khan used  two different proxies  for infrastructure  investment:  (1) a proxy  based on the
premise  that infrastructure  investments  have  a long gestation  period  and therefore  the tre-id level  of total
public inves,ment  can represent  infrastructure;  and (2) a proxy that posits that because  of its long run
nature, infrastructure  investment  is more likely to be anticipated. However,  infrastructure  investment  is
usually  very lumpy. Therefore,  the measure  based  on the trend level  of investment  may  be reflecting  otber
types of investment  spending  that are fairly stable over time. Similiarly,  expenditure  on infrastructure  is
often uncxpected  since  it can, by its nature, be postponed  if neglect  or deterioration  is tolerable. Also,
because public investment  in infrastructure  in developing  countries is often associated  with borrowed
resources  from banaks  or donors,  there is likely  to be even  greater uncertainty  in formulating  expectations
about future outlays.-7-
positioz. that  government infrastructure investment crowds in  private investment whereas other
public investment crowds out private activitv.' 6
A later study of the effect of public policy on private investment in Turkey by Chhibber
and van  Wijnbergen used Blejer and  Khan's framework, but  used actual data  on government
infrastructure  spending." They also calculated real  effective interest rates  that  took  explicit
account  of  compensating balances.  Compensating balances  are  a  means by  which  banks
circumvent low adrministered  interest rates by requiring borrowers to place deposits in non-interest
bearing accounts as guarantees for loans,'  Their econometric  results show significant  coefficients
for output, the real effective  cost of borrowing,  and private sector credit as a share of GNP. The other
two explanatory  variables  tried, an index  of capacity  utilization  and the share of infrastructure  in total
public  investment,  did not have  sigaificant  coefficients.  They  conclude  that the effect  of governrent policy
on private investment is complex and must be analyzed in light of a range of relevant policies including
exchange  rates and institutional factors such as export promotion  programs. The high rate of public
investment in Turkey resulted in some inflation and a raising of interest rates; however, it also insured
that the economy's adjustment effort was growth-oriented.
In summary, the empirical work on investme:;  in developing countries has tended to draw from
the  standard  models  in  the  literature  and  add  elements  that  are  relevant  to  the  economy under
16In contrast,  Balassa findb evidence that public investment and private investment are negatively
correlated using Blejer  and Khan's data set.  Balassa,  1988.
17 Chhibber and van Wijnbergen, 1988.
i8Chibber and  van Wijbergen use a technique based on the relationship  between commercial bank
deposits  for  transactions  purposes  and  commercial bank  loans  for  transactions  uses  to  assess  the
importance of compensating balances in Turkey.  The excess of deposits over uses reflects the importance
of compensating balances.  See Chhibber  and  van Wijnbergen, 1988 for  a description  of  a technique
originally proposed by Ersel and Sak, 1989.- 8 -
consideration. Many  of the early studies, such  as those of FTry  and Tun Wai  and Wong,  simply  produced
a list of variables that are correlated with investment  in particular countries.  Despite the problems
associated with fixed factor coefficients  in the accelerator model and the limitations of the partial
adjustment  model  described  above,  Blejer  and Khan's model  represented  an early attempt to develop  the
theoretical  underpinnings  of an investment  model  tailored  to a developing  economy.  The  model  developed
below is in the same spirit, but attempts to use realistic microfoundations  as the starting p,oint  for a
macroeconomic  model of investment  that incorporates  the effects  of government  policy. In addition, the
econometric testing that  follows will in.orporate the recent literature on  stationarity testing and
cointegration  to avoid the spurious  correlations  absociated  with trended time series and to allow for an
analysis  of the long run equilibrium  relationship  between  investment  and its determinants.
2.  Microfoundations  for  a  Developing  Economy
The microfoundations described below have emerged from a survey of fifty private sector
firms in Egypt.  The purpose of the survey was to identify those factors that  influenced private
sector investment decisions in order to develop a realistic analytical model and to contribute to
the interpretation of the econometric results.  The methodology, questionaire and detailed survey
results are available elsewhere.' 9 The discussion here will be limited to  deriving a theoretical
model of  the firm's  investment decision-making process that  reflects the conditions that  may
prevail in many developing, as well as in some developed, . onomies.
"9  Shafik,  1989.2.1.  Market Structure,  Pricing  and Optimization
Because  most private firms in developing  econormies  are managed by their owner, the "black
box" assumption that the objectives of shareholders are the same as those of the firm's managers
is fairly plausible.  Such an assunption  would not necessarily be as credible in an economy where,
because of separation between management and shareholders, there may be multiple objectives
within the firm on the part of different decision-makers.20 Consequently, the objective function
hypothesized is a standard maximization of the expected utility (EU) of operating profits (ii):
(1)  Max EU(n  ).
Output markets in developing countries are often characterized by oligopoly because of
market  size,  government  policies,  financial  barriers,  technological  considerations,  supply
eanstraints  and a  variety of structural  features of developirg econornies.  Consequently, it is
important  to  allow for  the possibility of a  divergence between price and  marginal cost  when
considering the firm's optimization problem.  Similiarly, because investment decisions tend to be
irreversible since second hand markets for capital goods often do not  function efficiently, and
there are large costs associated with  asset liquidation,  expectations about  future demand and
profits are important.
X "Managerial"  models  consider  the nature of the objective  function in a corporate structure.  See
Marris, 1964;  Marris and Wood, 1971. The assumption  of profit maximization  may also be valid where
corporate managers  have a shareholding  stake in the ftrm or where  the firm is faced with the threat of
bankruptcy. See Jensen and Meckling,  1976  and Grossman  and Hart, 1982. The more recent literature
on "principal-agent"  problems considers how principals (shareholders)  can manipulate the incentive
structure so as to produce  optimizing  behavior  on the part of agents (mnanagers).- 10  -
Consider the following  .inition  of costs that  distinguishes between direct production
costs and the indirect cost of capital  as well as differences between imported and  domestically
produced inputs:
(2)  C - WL + (l1-.)P  DMD +  leP 5 wM7  +  [(_El)P  kD +  9ePk-) [(d  +  r  - z) (1-i)/(1-u)J
where
C  =  total  costs
W  =  wages
L  =  labor
+  =  share of imported raw materials and intermediates
pmD =  price of domestic materials  and intermediates
Pw  =  price of imported materials Pnd  intermediates
e  =  exchange rate
M  =  domestic raw materials and intermediates
Mw  =  imported raw materials  and intermediates
I  =  investment
e  =  share of imported capital goods
Pk'  =  price of domestic capital goods
pW  =  price of imported capital goods
8  =  depreciation rate
r  =  interest rate
z  =  capital gains
i  =  present value of tax savings from investment incentives
u  =  rate of corporate taxation
The disaggregation of costs into a domestic and foreign component is useful because it
allows for the consideration of an explicit role for the exchange rate, an important feature of the
investment process in developing economies. 2'  This  is because in many developing economies
21This is highlighted in Chhibber and Shafik, 1990.foreign exchange is rationed and investment is usually highly import dependent given the small
size of the domestic capital goods industry.
Consider the simple case where there are N producers of a standardized product, a single
selling price, no new entry, cost functions of firms may be different, and inputs and outputs are
sold to price-takers.  It is then possible to derive the markup over costs from a standard profit
maximizing framework that  takes into  account the interdependence of firms'  decisions under
oligopoly.22
Each firm has a profit function:
(3)  i  =  p(Q)qj - C, (qi)
where p =  f(Q)  and  Q  = E qi.
The profit maximizing first and second order conditions are:
(4)  d  i/dqi = p + qi (dp/dQ  . dQ/dqi)  - dC,/dqi  = 0
(5)  d  2t/dqi  < 0 for all i.
22  For a detailed  derivation,  see Waterson,  1984. It is possible  to derive  the model  with heterogeneous
products, differentiated  prices, and potential entry of competitors,  but the assumptions  made here serve
to simplify  the exposition.- 12  -
Rearranging equation (4) and using the above definition of Q, it is possible to derive the deviation
of price from marginal cost as:
(6)  = si(l+ai)/4
where  -r  =  mark up over costs for the ith firm.
aj  =  dQ/dqi  = effect  of the  ith  firm's  output  on  other  firms' output
s;i  =  ith  firm's  market  share
I  =  price elasticity of demand.
The outcome of the firm's optirnization problem depends on those features that characterize
an oligopolistic situation: the industry demand elasticity, market structure or concentration, and
beliefs about  rival  behavior.  The price cost margin, or  mark up,  in equation  (6) allows fox
situations in which firms may have different marginal costs of production, be of different sizes,
and hold different conjectures about how their rivals will react.  Policies such as protection would
affect the mark up through the firm's market share and the price elasticity of demand.
The firms profits  are determined by the  mark up  rate,  costs,  and  the level of aggregate
demand in the economy:
(7)  n  =  f(r,  Y, C)
where  i  =  profits
Y  =  aggregate  demand
C  =  costs.- 13 -
In addition to determining aggregate investment in the economy, profits are crucial at the
firmn  level because they generate the internal funds that facilit3te investment. This is particularly
important in developing countries where capital markets usually do not satisfy the conditions for
the Modigliani-Miller theorem to hold. 23 Because stock markets, where they exist, are usually
underdeveloped  and shareholders are rarely anonymous, there is little pressure on management to
distribute dividends.  Where financial markets are characterized by artificially low adminsitered
interest rates, firms have a greater incentive to use debt financing since their borrowing costs are
being subsidized by depositors.
The firm's desired investment (I)  depends on expected mark ups, demand and costs:
(8)  1  = f(.r,  Ye,  CO)
These determinants of the capital stock in equation (8) reflect an array of variables outlined above
including market shares, price elasticities, rival behavior, exchange rates, wages, interest rates,
taxes, investment incentives, and the price of capital goods.
23  The  Modigliani-Miller  theorem  posits  that firms  are indifferent  between  internal  and external  sources
of financing  under specific  assumptions  about the way  in which  capital mnarkets  operate. Modigliani  and
Miller, 1958. Even  in indLstrialized  economnies  with well-funclioning  capital markets  there is considerable
empirical  evidence  that rettsntions  are an important  determinant  of investment.  For example,  in the United
Kingdom,  retained  profits accounted  for approximately  75%  of the finance  for new  investment. See King,
1977,  p. 209.- 14-
2.2.  Investment  Dynamics:  An  Error  Correction  Approach
The process  by  which firms  move from  actual  to  desired levels of  capital  stock  is
hypothesized to follow an error correction process. There are a number of advantages to such an
approach.  Firstly, error correction models have proven to be usefvl for explaining a variety of
long run macroeconomic relationships.24  Secondly,  unlike the more common partial adjustment
model, the  error  correction  approach  implies that  firms incur no  costs for  changes that  are
planned.25 Thirdly, the recent literature on cointegration provides a theoretical rationale for the
empirical success of error  correction models.26  Specifically, the  error  correction  levels term
captures  the  long run  equilibrium relationship  between variables while the  differenced terms
capture the dynamics. Granger establishes that error correction models produce cointegrating sets
of variables and  that  cointegrating  series can be represented by an error  correction process.27
Series are said to cointegrate if some linear combination produces a stationary, or "white noise,"
error.  Fourthly,  the error  correction framework is intuitively appealing because it  provides a
realistic representation of how rational, but fallible, agents make decisions.  In the context of a
developing country in which information may be far from perfect, decisions about the long run
capital stock desired are likely to be characterized by gradualism and revision.
24  Davidson, Hendry, Srba, and Yeo, 1978;  Bean, '981;  Currie, 1981;  Salmon, 1982; Henry and
Minford,  1988.
25 Nickell, 198.5.
26  Engle and Granger, 1987;  Jenkinson, 1986;  Dolado and Jenkinson,  1987;  Giovanetti, 1987;  Henry
and Minford,  1988.
27 Granger, 1983  and 1986.- 1  5  -
The firm's  intertemporal optimization problem is to  minimize the costs associated with
adjusting to the desired capital stock over an infinite horizon.  Given the following quadratic cost
or loss function:28
(9)  Min  EVc(It  - It*)2  +  (It  - it.1)2
Differentiating the above, an equation of the error correction form is obtained:
(10)  &It = aOA  It  + al(I.,  - It ,*) + a2A  I,..
This formulation implies that investment responds both to  changes last period as in the
partial adjustment model as well as to changes in the target,  I*.  The levels term, (It,  - It., *),
captures  the  divergence from  the  long  run  equilibrium  relationship  caused by  the  costs  of
adjustment.
The relationship between the desired level of investment and the desired capital stock is defined
conventionally as:
(11)  it  = K*  - (I  -
where o  =  rate of depreciation.
28  For other derivations  of error correction  models,  see Nickell, 1985;  and Davidson,  Hendry, Srba
and Yeo, 1978. For an earlier derivation  of an error correction-type  model  intended  to explain farmers'
supply response  to prices,  see Nowshirvani,  1971.- 16  -
Thus the firm chooses a desired level of investment given a lagged capital stock so as to achieve
its desired capital stock.  With irreversible or putty-clay technology, it is necessary to assume that
0. 1t  2 O.
Using equation (8) that defines the stochastic process generating the optimal target investment to
substitute into equation (10) and assuming that expectations are realized, one obtains the dynamic
reduced  form for investment:
(12)  Ait  =  DOAr, +  PIAYt +  2ACt  +  a, (,.r  tl  - 4Yt.  - 5Ct.,)+a2AIt., +  et
where et = error term.
This is the equation that  will be estimated econometrically below.
The above model provides a framework for analyzing the consequences of an  array  of
government policies for private in-estment.  Policies that affeet aggregate demand enter directly
through the accelerator term.  Protective tariffs and quotas as well as a domestic licensing system
that restricts new entrants alter firm mark ups and result in higher investrment  in those sectors.
Government policies that affect the costs associated with investment can enter through a number
of channels defined in equation (2) including the exchange rate, interest rate, tax incentives, and
rate of corporate taxation.- 17  -
3.  Empirical  Evidence
3.1.  The Data
The period chosen for econometric  analysis, 1960-1986,  was, to some  extent, determined
by data availability.  The sample  encompasses  two different  periods  in Egypt's  economic  history,
especially  in terms of the relationship  between  the public and private sectors.  Prior to  1974,
Egypt  followed  an essentially  statist import  substitution  policy  whereas  after 1974  the government
sought to encourage  the private sector under  the banner of the "open  door policy,"  or "infitah.''
The evolution  of private investment  over the sample  period is depicted  in Figure 1.  Whether  the
underlying  determinants  of investment  were stable under these two subperiods  will be explored
econometrically.
The data in Egypt, like that in most developing  countries, are limited in terrs  of both
quantity and quality.  Quarterly  observations  are not available  for the vast majority  of economic
variables  and methods  for their estimation  are sometimes  shrouded  in mystery.29  Consequently,
a number  of different sources  were used and cross referenced  whenever  possible.  Even when
reasonably  reliable series  are available, there is the perpetual  problem of matching  theoretical
concepts  in economics  to the statistics  compiled  by governments.  Nevertheless,  while the precise
magnitudes  of the variables are debatable, the general trends are confirmed  by the historical
experience  as well as by the survey  results.
"For a useful  description  of data sources  and  causes  of discrepancies,  see  Mabro  and  Radwan,  1976,
pp. 242-65. For a more  recent  discussion  of the idiosyncrasies  of Egyptian  economic  data, see  Hansen,
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The defiaitions, derivations, and sources of the variables used in the equations that follow
are available in the data appendix to this paper.  A few comrnents concerning their definitions
are made below, but the detailed derivations are provided in the appendix.  All data are annual,
expressed in  real  1980 prices and are in logarithms.30  In the discussion that  follows, a  "D"
before a variable name represents a differenced variable where the lag operator,  (I-L)  is used.
The first lag of a  variable is represented by (-1) and  the second lag by (-2).  The following
acronyms are used:
PRIVI  =  private investment
GDP  =  GDP at factor costs (non-oil)
R  =  real  interest  rate
RIW  =  real interest rate/average wage
MARKUP  =  markup
ICOSTS  =  relative price of investment goods
PRVCRD  =  private  credit
PVCRDY  =  private credit/GDP
GVIINF  =  government investment in infrastructure
An investment deflator  was  anstructed  using a  weighted average  of  the  investment
components of the wholesale price index (domestic machinery, imported machinery, construction,
and transport equipment) with variable weights based on actual shares of these inputs  in total
investment costs.  Because the  machinery component  of  the  official  WPI  only  includes
30  It is conventional  in the econometric  literature on investment  to express  all variables  in real terms
since the investrment  rwccess  is perceived as a "real" phenomenon.  This view was challenged by Anderson
who argued for the  Lse of nominal prices since signals are transmitted  in nominal terms and it  is not
possible to accurately represent the process by which agents translate these signals into a real expenditure
framework.  However, Bean has pointed  out  that  using a  nominal framework implies that  all  price
movements arc; unanticipated,  whereas only divergences of actual from expected prices should matter.
In a developing economy accustomed to a fairly steady rate of inflation as in Egypt, economic agents are
likely to anticipate inflationary trends.  Consequently, Anderson's nominal framework seems  inappropriate
and all variables have been expressed in real terms.  For a discussion, see Anderson, 1981, p. 89 and Bean,
1981, p.  104. In a hyperinflation economy, nominal prices mnay  become important  signals for  investors.
See Oks, 1987 for an analysis of the Argentine experience.- 20
domestically produced capital goods (which only constitute about 200/o  of total machinery inputs),
a separate weight was given to the price of imported capital goods.  This was constructed by using
a price index for  machinery exports of the major industrial  countries,  Egypt's  major trading
partners,  multiplied by the parallel market exchange rate in  Egypt.  Thus,  the exchange rate
enters  as  an  explicit  determinant  of  investment costs  in  order  to  reflect  its  importance  in
determining the price of imports.  The resulting investment deflator was used to put private and
public capital formation in real terms and to analyze the evolution of investment costs.
In order to test the microfoundaticns, empirical proxies were needed to represent profits
which are a function of demand, costs and the markup.  The demand proxy used is the non-oil
gross domestic product.  Revenues  from petroleum were removed to avoid double counting since
they accrued to the government and did not act directly as a source of private demand.  Instead,
the effect of oil rents operated through the government budget rather than directly through the
accelerator.  The effect of remittances of migrant labour on demand is ambiguous.  Remittances
are repatriated to  Egypt either in the form of financial assets or, possibly more importantly, in
kind as imports of goods.  Financial remittances held in Egyptian pounds (LE), foreign exchange
accounts in Egypt are invested by the banks in the Eurocurrency market and imply no net inflow
of foreign exchange to  Egypt, although interest incorme  from abroad does accrue to the migrant
investor and a commission is earned by the bank.  Financial remittances held in LE, however,
have the effect of increasing domnestic  credit and the country's  net foreign exchange reserves.
In contrast,  remittances repatriated  in the form of goods have a dampening effect on domestic- 21  -
demand since they substitute for domestic production.  Consequently, GDP, rather than GNP
which includes some estimate for rermittances,  is used here as the preferred proxy for demand. 3
Two different empirical representations of the cost of capital goods have been considered.
Some elements of the theoretical representation of the cost of capital defined in equation (2) will
not be considered in the empirical work for Egyp.  As with most empirical analyses of investrnent,
the effect of the rate of appreciation of capital goods (z) is neglected because of the absence of
data  and  the fact that  without an  active second hand  market for  machinery, this capital  gain
cannot  be readily realized.  The effect of taxation (u) and investment incentives (i) will not be
included, again for lack of data and because they are relatively unimportant because of widespread
tax evasion and the introduction of tax holidays under the "open door" policy  Data on the rate
of depreciation of the capital stock is not available and the practice of using a constant rate as
a proxy will have no effect on the econometric results.  Although the view that  depreciation is
an  economic variable that  depends on the firm's  scrapping and maintenance decisions is more
attractive, it is empirically intractable in most countries. 3'
The elements of the cost of capital that will be evaluated directly will be the cost of credit,
(r-p),  the  relative  cost  of  factors,  (RAW) and  the  relative  price  of  capital  goods,
[(I-O)PkD+flePkw].  The cost of credit is proxied by the WPI-deflated discount rate (R)."  The
3'  Although  the governrnent  tries to estimate  the value of remittances,  including  those in kind, it is
generally  believed  that the official  statistics are underestimates.
32  See Nickel], 1978  for a discussion.
33The discount rate is an adequate  proxy  for borrowing  costs since  the difference  between  the two
has been fairly constant as a result of central bank regulation  of fees and comrnissions.- 22  -
relative cost of factors is represented by the ratio of the real interest rate to the average wage in
the economy (R/W).  The cost of capital  term does not  take into account  the implications of
compensating balanc-,s for  the  effective cost  of  borrowing.  Since the  practice of  requiring
compensating balances is not legal, there are no data  available to evaluate the impact on real
borrowing costs.  In the absence of data in the Egyptian case, it was necessary to assume that the
degree to which compensating balances respond to higher inflation is constant and therefore will
have no effect on the coefficient estimates.
The relative price of capital goods is represented by the variable ICOSTS which is based
on the ratio  of the investment deflator  to the GDP deflator.  Treating the cost of investment
goods  separately  from  the  cost  of  borrowing  is  desirable  because it  isolates  the  effect  of
neoclassical price factors from Keynesian considerations about the interaction  of demand and
supply in  the capital  goods market.  In  effect, the  ICOSTS variable operationalizes  Keynes'
marginal efficiency of capital for an economy where, because of credit market imperfections, it
is distinct  from  the interest  rate.34  For  traded  capital  goods, supply is  highly elastic and
therefore the price to firms depends solely on the world price and the exchange rate.  However,
for nontraded capital goods, supply is more inelastic and one would expect considerable increases
in the price of construction and land, for example, in the case of an investment boom.  The use
of  variable  weights in  the  investment deflator  also  captures  the  effect of  relative prices on
changing shares of tradable and nontradable capital goods.  It is hypothesized that ICOSTS is a
34 Recall from the standard presentation  of Keynes' model, investment  occurs until the marginal
efficiency  of investment  is equal to the rate of interest.  However,  this equilibrium  relationship  emerges
out of the interaction between  demand  and supply  in the capital goods  producing  industry. Because  the
supply  function for capital goods  is upward  sloping, the response  of investment  to a change  in the rate
of interest is gradual.  For a discussion,  see Precious, 1987.- 23  -
more realistic representation of the cost of capital to the firm in a financially repressed developing
economy than the neoclassical interest rate variable.
The movement of the relative cost  of investment goods is depicted in  Figure  2.  The
downward trend in the price of investment goods after  the 1967 war reflects some of the early
attempts  of the  government to  encourage private  investment.  Investmnent  incentives, such as
subsidies to  buildings materials and machinery, and the real appreciation of the exchange rate
during the oil windfall had the effect of reducing the relative cost of investment goods.  This is
consistent with the survey findings where firms, especially  those established during the "open door
policy," were found to  be characterized by greater capital  intensity.  After  1980, the price of
investment goods rose sharply reflecting the increasing price of both imported investment goods
subject to a depreciating exchange rate and non-traded investment goods responding to growth
in demand.  This pattern  in the movemnent  of investment costs had important implications for
firms' decisions about factor shares, an issue that will be discussed at a later stage.35 The proxy
used for markups is the ratio of the wholesa'e price index to an index of wages in the economy.
Although this proxy does not capture the complexity of mark up determination described above,
it  does provide a  crude indicator of  the evo;ution  of the  profit  rate  at  the aggregate level.
Alternatively, this mark-up variable can be interpreted as the irverse of real wages.  Figure 3
depicts the movement  of narkups over the period.  Markups were relatively high during the 1960s,
a pattern that coincides with the survey findings that, for firrns that survived the nationalizations,
the 1960s  were a highly p-ofitable period.  Specifically, the absence of competition, subsidies to
inputs, relatively low wages and considerable unsatisfied demand meant that  firms were able to
35  Evidence  about firms' technological  choices  in favour of greater capital intensity  emerged  from the
survey. See chapter 4 in Shafik, 1989  for a discussion.RELATIVE  PRICE  OF  INVESTMENT  GOODS
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charge a  high markup over costs.  Part of this markup)  can alsc be considered a  risk premium
given the highly uncertain environment in which firms were operating.  The trend of markups is
generally downward with small upturn during the oil boom of the late  1970s. After 1980, there
is a  squeeze on markups as a result of rising wages.  This does not  imply that  markups were
negative after 1980, but only that wages were increasing at a faster pace than were output prices.
An important factor that it has not been possible to capture econometrically is the effect
of protection.  The importance of securing protection, often before an investment is made, was
an important theme among the firms surveyed. However, because rates of effective protection are
industry-specific, and  often firm-specific, it  is virtually impossible to  construct  a  meaningful
indicator of the overall protective regime and its effect on markups.  Instead, the implications of
protection for firms' markups were considered at the sectoral level and are available elsewhere.
The justification  for introducing government policy variables in the econometrics is that
they may affect costs, markups or demand independently of the empirical proxies used here.  For
example, government investment in infrastructure may reduce the costs faced by firms, although
it may not be reflected in the ICOSTS variable.  Similarly, government borrowing on the domestic
credit market may reduce credit availability to  the private sector in a rationed market directly
although it may have no effect on administered interest rates.  The effect of public policy will be
evaluated  through  both  government expenditure variables,  particularly  public  investment in
infrastructure (GVIINF), and through the implications of the financing of the government deficit
on the availability of private credit.
34  Shafik, 1989.- 27  -
The variable for governrnent investmnent  in infrastructure is the sum of public investment
in  agriculture, irrigation,  electricity, transport,  construction and utilities.3  The evolution  of
government investment expenditure in infrastructure (GVIINF) and in other areas is depicted in
Figure 4.  There is a general decline in  public investment in the wake of the 1967 war with a
recovery during tbe windfall period of 1975-80. Aggregate investment and that in infrastructure
grew as a share of GDP during the oil boom of the 1970s. The squeeze on public investment did
not occur until the early 1980s and seems to have fallen disproportionately on infrastructure and
industry
In  order to  evaluate the potential  rationing effect of government administered interest
rates, quantity  variables for credit will be considered in addition to  the more conventional real
interest rate term.  The quantity of credit to the private sector, both the level (PVCRD) and as
a share of GDP (PVCRDY), will bea  considered.  The quantity of credit is likely to be important
in  a  credit  market  where interest  rates  are  subsidized, balance sheets  are  unreliable,  and
reputation  is an important  determinant of access to bank credit.  In addition,  the quantity  of
credit captures  the effect of financial remittances held in  Egyptian pounds, which may be  an
important  factor  in  investment determination.  The  more commonly discussed channel  for
crowding out,  the government deficit, will also be considered.  The conventional view is that
deficit financing bids up interest rates which reduces private capital formation and results in
"  Total government  investment  and non-infrastructure  public  investment  were  also tried as explanatory
variables  but were found to be insignificant. Non-infrastructure  investment  was  defined as the residual
from total investment which consisted of government investmnent  in industry, petroleum, trade and finan  .e,
housing, and services.  This in part reflects the very long lags associated with public investment in areas
such as health and education services.COMPOSITION  OF  GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT
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indirect crowding out.38  However, in a  rationed credit  market with administered prices, the
effect of deficit financing will be on the quantity of credit rather than on the price and therefore
is more likely to be reflected in the PVCRD variable.
3.2.  Econometric  Estimation:  Methodology
Investment functions are notoriously difficult to  estimate, often for  two very different
reasons.  Many of the macroeconomic  time series that are relevant to investment decisions, such
as output, are trended and tend to generate spurious regressions. In addition, other v.Ariables  that
are expected to  matter,  such as  the interest  rate,  are often not  significant because they are
stationary whereas investment is usually characterized by a trend.
Granger  and  Newbold recommend differencing data  when  spurious  correlations  are
suspected."  By differencing, stationarity  of the time series is more likely and more mneaningful
parameter estimates can be obtained.  However, simply differencing all of the timie  series is both
ad hoc ar,J results in the loss of information about the equilibrium relationship betwecn the levels.
In add:tion, it is possible to introduce a trend into already stationary timne  series by indiscriminate
diffe:encing.
3'There  is also an indirect  channel  for crowding  in when  bonds are closer  substitutes  for money  than
they are for capital.  The resulting portfolio effects as  agents switch into capital reinforces the
expansionary  effect of a fiscal stimulus. This result is obtained by B. Freidman  in a three asset model
with bonds,  money  and capital.  B. Freidman,  1978,  1985. Given the absence  of an active  bond market
in most developing  economies,  this channel for indirect  crowding  is not very relevant.
39 Granger and Newbold,  1974.- 30  -
As an  interesting aside,  some ol  the  standard models of investrment  in  the  literature
(accelerator, flexible accelerator, neoclassical, putty-clay, partial adjustment, and profits models)
were estimated in the levels on Egyptian data.40  The results in the levels indicated that some
combination of putty-clay, profits and partial adjustment wt,.ld produce a well-fitting investment
function.  However, once the data were differenced, virtually all of the models collapsed.  This
implies that what has been interpreted as causality in a number of empirical studies of investment
may have been spurious correlations between trended variables.
The recent literature  on cointegiation and stationarity  testing provides a more rigorous
framework for  avoiding spurious  regression while retaining long  run  information  about  the
equilibrium relationship in the levels.  Essentially, the intutition  behind cointegration  is that
econometric results  are  legitimate  only  when  time  series  are  stationary. 4'  Therefore  it  is
necessary to test the time series properties in order to deternisne what degree of differencing, if
any, is necessary  to  de-trend the data.  Once stationarity is achieved, if somne  linear combination
of the variables results in a "white noise" error term, the series are said to be cointegrated.  This
implies that it is possible to explain the evolution of the time series through the interaction of a
set of non-trended data that results in an error term that is random, thereby leaving nothing left
to explain econometrically.
40 See Shafik, 1989  for these results.
4'  For a survey  of the literature, see a special  issue of the Oxford  Bulletin  of Economics  and Statistics
with articles  by Hendry,  1986;  Granger,  1986;  Hall, 1986;  Jenkinson,  1986;  as well  as work  by Dolado and
Jenkinson, 1987;  and Engle  and Granger, 1987.- 31
3.4.  Stationarity  Testing
Dickey-Fuller (DF), Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), and the Cointegrating Regression
Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test  proposed by  Sargan and  Bhagrava were used to  test  whether
variables were stationary (1(0)) or needed to be first differenced  (1(1)) or second differenced (1(2))
to induce stationarity. 42 The Dickey-Fuller test where the null hypothesis is a simple unit root
(1(1)) takes the form:
n
a Xt =  Y  + ,Eaj AX.j + et  where H:  1(1).
'Where  the null hypothesis is 1(2), the test statistics is:
P,  n
AAXt =  +AX,  +Ea j AAXIj + et where H:  1(2).
J=l
The test statistics is the standard "t" test on the lagged dependent variable (p).  Because
the test is sensitive to whether a drift (C) andlor a time trend (T) are included, it was repeated
in different forms for each variable.  The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test includes second and third
lags of the left hand side variable to capture any additional dynamics. The critical values for the
ADF test are the same as those for the DF test. 43
42 Dickey  and Fuller, 1979;  Dickey  and Fuller, 1981;  and Sargan and Bhargava,  1983.
4  Engle  and Granger, 1987,  p. 269.- 32  -
The Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson test is the standard Durbin-Watson statistic
that results from regressing the difference of the variable on a constant when the null is l(l)  and
the second difference on  a constant when the null is  1(2).  The need to  try  an  array  of test
statistics reflects the low power of the alternative tests of stationarity and the evolving nature of
this literature.
The results of the DF, ADF and CRDW tests are presented in Table 1.  The DF and ADF
tests are reported separately for regressions with only the lagged dependent variable and with the
addition of a constant term (C) and with a time trend (T).  The results indicate that the majority
of the time series have simple unit roots, or are l(l).  The  -only exception is the real interest rate,
R which is I(O). However, the relative price of factors, R/W, is l(l).
The  fact  that  the  time  series have simple unit roots  is  analytically  convenient since
stationarity is achieved by first differencing. The levels of the series can be used to express the
long run equilibrium relationship by which agents are adjusting their actual to  desired capital
stock.  Because their  target  capital  stock  is  changing  over  time,  agents  correct  for  their
expectational errors in the levels terms.
Two different methods for estimating an error correction model with cointegrating series
will be used below.  The first  will be a two step procedure advocated by Engle and Granger
which tests for cointegration  at  the levels stage before considering the dynamic properties."
The validity of the second stage dynamnic  results depends on having an appropriate specification
"Engle  and Granger, 1987.- 33  -
Table 1:  TESTING  FOR UNIT ROOTS:  DICKEY-FULLER (DF), AUGMENTED
DICKEY-FULLER (ADF) AND COINTEGRATING REGRESSION
DURBIN-WATSON  TESTS (CRDW)
VARIABLE  OF  DF  AOF  ADF  DF  W/  C  DF  W/  C  ADF  WI  C
H10:I(1)  HO0:I(2)  HO0:I1()  HO:I(2)  110:I(1)  H10:I(2)  H10:I(1)
PRIVr  2.85  -3.48  1.88  -2.81  -0.75  -4.30  -0.46
GDP  3.39  -3.54  2.32  -3.13  0.13  -4.81  0.82
RI  -3.83  -6.99  -3.51  -6.49  -3.75  -6.85  -3.51
R/W  0.31  -5.87  0.31  -5.30  -1.61  -6.18  -1.47
MARKUP  -0.69  -2.53  -0.80  -1.99  0.53  -2.95  0.77
ICOSTS  -0.79  -4.67  -0.78  -3.77  -0.96  -4.58  -0.85
PVCRD  2.74  -4.20  1.51  -3.54  .1.22  -5.21  0.88
BYCRDY  -1.01  -5.34  -1.02  -4.79  -0.02  -5.48  0.16
GVIINF  0.19  -3.36  0.53  -2.92  -1.04  -3.26  -2.41
CRITICAL  VALUES  t-2.61  t.3.20
ADF  W/  C  DF  W/  CST  DF  W/  C&T  ADF  w/  C&TADF  W/  C&T  CRDW  CROW
H0:1(2)  H0:I(1)  H0:I(2)  H0:I(1)  H0:I(2)  HO:I(1)  HO:I(2)
PRIVI  -3.30  -1.75  -4.21  -1.74  -3.21  0.04  1.76
GDP  -4.44  -1.55  -4.79  -1.86  -4.89  0.05  2.00
R  -6.30  -4.00  -6.69  -3.46  -6.15  1.46  2.68
R/W  -S.29  -3.58  -5.91  -3.08  -5.39  0.49  2.59
MARKUP  -2.23  -1.32  -2.64  -1.34  -1.98  0.06  1.10
ICOSTS  -3.65  -0.60  -5.03  -0.44  -5.15  0.32  1.70
PVCRD  -4.47  -1.00  -6.24  -1.59  -5.46  0.06  2.16
PVCRDY  -5.01  -1.54  -6.11  -1.76  -5.42  0.22  2.25
GVIINF  -2.93  -0.80  -3.22  -0.71  -3.95  0.17  1.57
DBFGD  -S.84  -2.82  -8.04  -4.11  -5.67  0.33  2.87
GOVEX  -2.37  -1.58  -2.73  -2.54  -1.95  1.33  2.47
GOVI  -2.02  -0.88  -2.83  -1.20  -1.94  1.09  2.29
NrGVEX  -3.92  -1.44  -4.61  -0.74  -4.35  1.98  2.71
CRITICAL  VALUES  t-2.85  CRDW-1.07
NOTE:  Wl  C  IS WITH  A  DRIFT  TERM;  W/  C.T  IS WITII OOTII A  DRIFT  TERM  AND  A  TIME  TREND.- 34  -
at the levels stage.  Because  of the limitations of the Engle-Granger procedure and the weak power
of cointegration tests, the model will also be estimated using a full dynamic version.  Starting
from the most general unrestricted dynamic equation possible, the model will be reparameterized
until  the most parsirnonious version i3 obtained.  This data-based approach to  modelling stems
from the view that although econormic  theory should guide the selection of variables that are
included,  the  actual  model should  emerge from the  data.4  Some authors  have argued  that
general dynamic modelling is suierior  to the Engle-Granger two stage procedure.46 Rather than
a desire to dive into the methodological debates between econometricians, the purpose of using
two different estimation techniques here is to provide confirmation of the results.  Hopefully, by
arriving  at  a  similiar model via  two different  routes,  the  validity of  the  argument will  be
strengthened.
Cointegration testing is still at an early stage, so the results must be treated as tentative,
especially given the relatively small sample size.  The small number of observations limits the
degree to which alternative lag structures can be explored without causing problems with degrees
of freedom.  It will be several decades before most developing economies have sufficient reliable
data  to  be able to estimate these types of models with confidence.  In the interimr however,
45  See Hendry and Richard, 1983  for a description of this methodology  and Bean, 1981 for an
application to investrnent  in the United Kingdom.
46 Jenkinson,  1987;  Banerjee  et al, 1987. The major  problem  with the Engic-Granger  procedure  is that
the validity  of the dynamic  differenced  results hinges  crucially  on the appropriateness  of the first stage
levels results, i.e. the equilibrium long run relationship hypothesized.  With unrestricted dynamic
modelling,  the choice of explanatory  variables  is based on empirical  significance.  The limitation of
unrestricted  dynamic  modelling  is on the number  of explanatory  variables that can be included  without
losing degrees  of freedom.- 35 -
economic policy must  be made  and  it  seems unwise to  do  it  without the  benefit  of  better
econometric techniques.
3.5.  Engle  and  Granger's  Two-Step  Estimator
The  first  stage of  the  Engle and  Granger  procedure involves exploring the  levels or
equilibrium part  of the error correction model to establish whether the variables cointegr. te.
Evidence of cointegration  includes an  R 2 that is close to  unity at the levels stage, significant
coefficients47,  a  significantly non-zero Cointegrating  Regression Durbin-Watson statistic,  and
significant Dickey-Fuller and  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests  on the  residuals from the levels
regression.  With cointegrating variables, the coefficient estimates from this levels regression can
be interpreted as the long run multipliers.  The second stage involves running regressions using
stationary time series (in this case, first differences) and including the lagged residuals from the
levels regressions as an explanatory variable. This lagged residual term, RES(-I), is intended to
capture the error correction process as agents adjust for expectational errors about the equilibrium
relationship in the previous period.
The first stage cointegrating levels regressions for investment are presented in Table 2.
Equation  I  represents  the  simplest version  of  the  modei presented  above with  no  explicit
government policy variables.  All of the variables are significant and appropriately signed and
"  Note that because  of autocorrelation  of the residuals,  the "t" statistics from the levels regression
are biased upwards and therefore it is not possible to assess the true significance  of the coefficient
estimates.  Howevc.,  it is possible  to accept  the insignificance  of coefficients  at the levels  stage since if
a variable is insignificant  when  "t" statistics are upwardly  bias, it will certainly be insignificant  for the
true value of the "t" statistics.- 36  -
Tablc2:  COINTEGRATING VECTORS  FOR INVESTIENT  (LEVELS REGRESSIONS)
VARIABLE  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
C  -32.54  -23.62  -29.88  -19.42  -9.05  -40.28  -32.66  -27.79
(6.90)  (3.36)  (7.11)  (3.59)  (2.35)  (5.76)  (4.08)  (3.22)
GDP  4.16  2.79  4.02  2.70  1.26  5.02  4.29  2  q7
(8.18)  (3.03)  (9.05)  (3.88)  (2.97)  (6.56)  (5.07)  (2.62)
ZCOSTS  -1.89  -1.14  -2.62  -1.94  -1.58  -2.19  -2.37  -1.79
(3.54)  (1.57)  (4.96)  (3.29)  (2.43)  (3.03)  (3.41)  (2.40)
KARZUP  1.23  0.51  1.72  1.33  2.20  1.96  1.20
(2.53)  (0.78)  (3.77)  (2.45)  (2.19)  (2.03)  (1.17)
R/W  1.14  -0.01  3.29
(0.75)  (0.003)  (1.99)
GVINP  0  .54  0.36  0.71  1.06
(1.79)  (1.53)  (3.39)  (2.50)
PVCRDY  0.93  1.35  1.00  0.76
(2.90)  (3.73)  (2.63)  (1.70)
DBFGD
GO  VEX
R2  0.95  0.94  0.91  0.97  0.95  0.94  0.95  0.94
R2(ADJ)  0.95  0.92  0.96  (.96  0.94  0.92  0.93  0.92
CRDW  1.53  1.40  1.47  1.80  1.24  1.27  1.23  1.25
F  151.90  64.96  152.71  94.17  89.75  65.52  58.78  35.98
DF  -3.95  -3.73  -4.06  -5-09  -3.85  -3.00  -3.02  -3.15
ADF(2)  -2.86  -2.08  -3.54  -4.17  -3.08  -2.33  -2.24  -2.0637  -
the  cointegration  statistics  are  promising.  Equation  2  considers the  effect of  government
infrastructure investment and results in a significant coefficient as well as positive indications of
cointegration.  Similarly, the  quantity  of  private  credit  which is  included in  equation  3 is
significant and generates favorable cointegration statistics.  This wouid seem to imply that there
was some rationing in credit markets that served to crowd out private investment.
On the surface, this result would appear to be inconsistent with the survey findings and
interviews with banks that credit markets were very liquid throughout much of the - .iod,  except
after the imposition of credit ceilings by the Central Bank as part of a reform package negotiated
with the International  Monetary Fund in  1987.  Established firms never complained about  a
shortage of credit prior to the imposition of ceilings, implying that government borrowing did not
crowd out some of the private sector through the financial system. In fact, some firms complained
that the banks put  pressure on them to borrow more.  Because real interest rates were negative
throughout the period, established flrms did tend to  borrow heavily since credit was, in some
sense, a  "free good."  However, credit was rationed at  the margin, especially for new, poorly
connected firms.  Government borrowing may have crowded out these new borrowers but, given
the conservatism of the financal system, it is not clear that the banks would have extended them
loans anyway.
Other  government spending variables,  such as  total  government investment and  non-
infrastructure government investment, were also  tried in all possible combinations and  always
appeared  with  an  insignificant  sign  and  generated  no  improvemnent  in  the  cointegration- 38 -
statistics.48 Given that  "t" statistics  are biased upwards when positive autocorrelation  exists,
insignificant coefficients at the levels stage imply that these variables should be omitted.
The combined effects of government investment in infrastructure and rationing in credit
markets are considered in equation 4.  The resualing levels equation has the best cointegration
statistics  as  evidenced by  the highly significant DF,  ADF,  and  CRDW tests.  Equation  5
illustrates  the importance of  the markup variable by indicating the  poor  performance of an
equation that does not include markups.  The preferability of expressing the costs of capital as
d function of the cost of investment goods (ICOSTS) and quantities of credit (PVCRDY) over the
more conventional factor price variable, RJW, is evidenced by equations 6 and 7.  Factor costs
are  insignificant when they are included with  ICOSTS in  equation  6 and  with  PVCRDY in
equation 7. The only case where the more conventional neoclassical representation of the cost of
capital is significant is in equation 8 where it appears with a positive sign.  This is not surprising
in a  rationed credit  market where a rise in the real interest rate generates a larger quantity of
credit available to investors through the banking system.  Consequently, the significance of R/W
in equation 8 seems to be merely oerving  as a proxy for the quantity of credit variable, PVCRDY.
The preferred specifications from these levels results are equations 3 and 4 which include
the quantity of private credit and government investmei,. in infrastructure.  The coefficients are
significant and appropriately signed.  The equations indicate that in the long run, the accelerator
has the greatest effect on investment, followed by the cost variable (ICOSTS). The markup is also
48 The insignificance  of these other government  spending  variables also occurred when they were
exoress  d in differences. The results are not reported  here because,  strictly speaking,  if there is no long
run relationship  at the levels  stage,  one would  not expect  to find significant  effects  in the dynamics. This
was consistently  so for these variables.- 39  -
important  with  a  long run  coefficient that  is over one.  The magnitude of  the effect of the
quantity  of credit  is greater than  that  for government infrastructure investment, but  both  are
significant.  The cointegration tests are favourable implying that  the error is "white noise."  As
in the only other known application of the Engle and Granger procedure to investment by Henry
and  Minford for  the  United Kingdomn,  a  fairly complex specification was necessary to  find
evidence of cointegration for investment. 49 This suggests that  previous studies that  relied on
fairly  simple models of  the  determinants of investment may have been misspecified.  These
preferred specifications will be used for the second staige  of the Engle and Granger procedure to
explore the dynarmics  of the investmnent  process.
The differenced  dynamic equations for investment are reported in Table 3.  The residuals
fro i the levels regressions are included in lagged formn,  (RES(-I)), to capture the process by which
agents adjust to  prediction errors in the last period.  Ideally, it would be possible to  include
several  lags  of  each  differenced variable  and  to  repararnaterize according  to  significance.
However, in order to preserve degrees of freedom, only one lagged difference was included.
lhe  results of running an unrestricted version of equation 3 from table 2 are reported in
equation  I of Table 3.  Reparameterizations based on significance are reported in equations 2, 3,
and  4.  A similar exercise that  includes governrnent investment in infrastructure is repeated in
equation  5  with  reparamaterizations  reported  in  equations  6,  7,  and  8  of  Table  3.  The
reparameterizations allow the alternative lag structures to be defined by the data.  In general, the
variables have significant and appropriate signs and the diagnostic statistics are good.  In
49 Henry  and Minford, 1988.- 40  -
Table 3: DYNAMIC EQUATIONS FOR INVESTMENT  (DIFFERENCE REGRESSIONS)
(Dependent variable is the difference of the
logarithm of real private investment)
VARIABLE  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
C  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.01  -0.05
(1.41)  (1.89)*  (1.42)  (0.61)  (0.49)  (1.16)  (0.08)  (0.86)
DGDP  1.97  1.39  1.34  1.55  1.90  1.61  1.88  2.65
(2.44)*"  (2.19)**  (2.03)**  (1.77)*  (1.37)  (2.14)**  (2.64)**  (3.26)**
DGDP(-1)  -0.72  -0.84
(0.88)  (0.96)
DXCOSTS  -2.00  -1.45  -'.44  -1.88  -1.75  -2.11  -2.20  -2.68
(2.44)**  (1.96)*  (1.92)*  (2.08)**  (1.29)  (2.65)**  (2.97)**  (3.07)**
DICOSTS(-1)  0.79  1.32  1.17  0.87
(1.10)  (1.58)  (1.79)*  (1.39)
DMARXUP  0.64  1.30  0.9  0.25  1.01
(1.12)  (2.69)**  (1.64)  (0.32)  (0.61)
DMARKUP(-1)  0.86  1.36  0.91  1.11  1.05
(1.59)  (2.93)**  (1.44)  (2.37)**  (2.41)**
DGVIINF  0.21  0.11
(0.89)  (0.61)
r1GVIINF(-1)  0.18  0.43  0.  20
(0.47)  (1.82)*  (0.77)
DPVCRDY  1.15  1.16  1.11  0.80  1.35  1.10  1.27  1.27
(3.78)**  (3.95)**  (3.84)**  (2.78)**  (4.05)**  (3.62)**  (4.26)**  (4.81)**
DPVCRDY(-1)  0.44  0.62  0.56  0.27
(1.42)  (2.54)**  (2.00)**  (0.73)
DPRIVI(-l)  0.19  0.11  0.37  0.22  0.33  0.50
(0.86)  (0.53)  (1.76)*  (0.66)  (1.72)*  (3.11)**
RES(-1)  -0.61  -0.39  -0.43  -0.63  -0.72  -0.52  -0.85  -1.33
(2.58)**  (2.23)**  (2.19)**  (2.60)**  (1.09)  (1.81)*  (2.60)*"  (4.82)**
R2  0.64  0.56  0.56  0.42  0.86  0.73  0.78  0.76
R2(ADJ)  0.39  0.41  0.38  0.22  0.62  0.57  0.63  0.62
SE  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.19  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.15
DW  1.73  1.74  1.86  1.89  2.10  1.56  1.91  1.66
F  2.53  3.77  3.14  2.16  3.61  4.54  5.00  5.43
DF  -5.14  -4.65  -5.03  -4.65  -4.78  -3.46  -4.22  -3.63
ADF(2)  -4.21  -3.88  -4.19  -4.30  -4.06  -2.43  -3.39  -3.16
CHOW  0.31  1.21  5.10  10.78
NOTES:  -NUMBERS  IN  PARENTHESES  ARE  T  STATISTICS.  ONE  ASTERISK  IMPLIES  SIGNIFICANCE  AT
THE  10%  LEVEL.  TWO  ASTERISKS  IMPLY  SIGNIFICANCE  AT  THE  5%  LEVEL.- 41  -
differenced form, the coefficient on the ICOSTS variable has the greatest magnitude, followed by
the accelerator (DGDP) and the markup.  The coefficient on government infrastructure investment
is smaller and significarntly  positive in equation 6.  C ven the long lead time on investment in
infrastructure,  it  is not  surprising that  the effects on private investment are initially  small in
magnitude.
These results of the second stage of the Engle-Granger procedure provide strong evidence
of the appropriateness of an error correction framework.  The lagged residuals from the levels
regressions, (RES(-I)), which represent the equilibrium error term, are always significant, implying
that  an  error  correction  mechanism exists  whereby  agents  adjust  their  expectations  to
unanticipated changes.  This implies that the equations have a long run or equilibrium solution
in the level of investment. The lagged private investment term is significant in equations 4, 7, and
8.  Given the limited scope for exploring further lagged effects, it is likely that the coefficient on
lagged private investment is capturing the effects of further lags of the right hand side variables
that cannot be included separately in the regressions.
The overall fit of the equation is evidenced  by the plot of the actual evolution of private
investment and that  predicted by equation 2 of Table 3 that  appears in Figure 5.  - The fitted
values for  private investment are very close to  the actuals over the  1960-86 period.  This is
remarkable given the  array  of  shocks during  this  period- two  wars, two  oil  shocks, and  a
fundamental change in economic policy orientation.  Chow tests for paramneter  stability  were
constructed for the best regressions in Table 3, equations 2, 4, 6 and 7, to test for a structural
break with the introduction of the "open door policy" reforms in 1974.  The results of the Chow
5Note that Figure 5 depicts private investrent in first differences.ESTIMATED PRIVATE INVESTMENT
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tests, also reported in Table 3, show considerable parameter stability for equations 2 and 4 during
the period.  This implies that the coefficient estimates for equations 2 and 4 in table 3 were not
significantly different in the 1962-74  period from those in the 1975-86  period.  These Chow test
results are encouraging since they indicate that the underlying determinants of investment in the
economy, or  "deep  parameters,"  have  been adequately  captured.  These results  from  the
Engle-Granger procedure will be compared with those from general dynamic modelling below.
3.6.  Unrestricted  Dynamic  Estimation
The results of the unrestricted dynamic equations are reported in Table 4.  Again, because
of the limited number of observations, it is not  possible to  include several lags of all  of the
variables.51  Instead, one lagged difference of each variable was included along with a  lagged
error correction term that  reflects the relationship in the levels:
ecm = (YK  - Ex,)
" This may  be an advantage  of the Engle-Granger  procedure  when  dealing  with small  samples. Engle
and Granger suggest  estirmating  the simplest  error correction model initially and then considering  the
effects  of lags.  Such  an approach  does preserve  degrees  of freedom,  although  the validity  of the results
hinge on having  the correct specification  at the first stage. Engle  and Granger, 1987.- 44  -
Table  :  UNRESTRICTED DYNAMIC EQUATIONS
(Dependent variable is the difference of the logarithm of
real private investment)
VARIABLE  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
C  -1.32  -2.10  -0.12  -0.13
(0.73)  (2.26)**  (0.67)  (0.75)
DGDP  1.02  1.06  1.41  0.83
(1.12)  (2.15)**  (1.63)  (1.43)
DGDP(-1)  -0.71  0.47
(0.65)  (0.53)
DICOSTS  -0.29  -0.68
(0.32)  (0.74)
DICOSTS(-1)  1.44  1.00  0.43
(1.69)  (1.92)*  (0.53)
DMARKUP  -0.06  0.44
(0.08)  (0.68)
DKARKUP(-1)  0.96  0.88  0.87  0.93
(1.38)  (1.95)*  (1.36)  (1.86)*
DGVIXNF  0.36  0.34
(1.57)  (2.16)**
DGVIINF(-1)  0.41  0.33
(1.52)  (1.84)*
DPVCRDY  1.12  1.05  1.07  1.10
(3.64)**  (4.30)**  (3.08)**  (3.67)**
DPRVCRDY(-1)  0.66  0.74  0.87  0.81







DPRIVI(-1)  -0.07  -0.10
(0.41)  (0.44)
ECM(-1)  -0.16  -0.25  -0.08  -0.08
(0.80) (2.35)**  (1.38)  (1.77)*
R2  0.85  0.83  0.54  O.S0
R2(ADJ)  0.60  0.71  0.21  0.34
SE  0.15  0.13  0.19  0.18
DW  1.64  1.66  1.59  1.87
F  3.33  6.75  1.62  3.51
DF  -4.1  -4.21  _4.73  -5.29
ADF(2)  -2.16  -2.31  -3.55  -4.11
CHow  1.13  2.07
NOTE:  THE  ECM  TERM  IS  DEFINED  AS  THE  DIFFERENCE  INI  TIHE  LEVELS  OF  TIIE  LEFT  IIAND SIDE  AND  RIGHIT
HAND  SIDE  VARIABLES.- 45  -
where Yt is the left hand side variable and XY  are the right hand side variables. 52 Although not
ideal, the lagged difference includes information from two years in the past, which coincides with
the  survey findings that  the  average lag between the conception and  implementation of  an
investment project was two years.  Consequently, although being able to include more lags would
be desirable, given the constraint,  the present approach is certainly adequate.
The results in equation  I of Table 4 and the resulting reparameterization in equation  2
confirm the importance of  government infrastructure investment and  the quantity  of  credit.
Equations were also estimated that consider the effects of non-investment  government expenditure
and  total  government investnent  which, like  those from the Engle-Granger estimates, always
generated insignificant coefficients. Equation 3 reports the results of including only the PVCRDY
variable along with  the core model.  The repararneterization in equation  4 implies that  only
demand and internal funds variables, i.e. output, markups and credit, matter.
An interesting feature of the results in Table 4 is that the ICOSTS variable takes a positive
sign in equation 2 that is significant at the 10%  level.  This may seem paradoxical since a rise in
investment costs would usually be associated with a fall in investnm-nt. However, in a  highly
oligopolistic market, changes in costs may not matter in the short run since they can be passed
on to consumers.  In addition, a rise in investmnent  costs may be reflecting, in part, increases in
aggregate demand in the short run.  However, the long run effect of a rise in investment costs on
52 This formulation  of the error correction  term restricts  the sum  of the coefficients  to unity. Ideally,
the coefficients of the levels terms would be estimated directly and then could be included in a composite
error correction term.  However, given the restrictions on degrees of freedom, it was not possible to use
this approach.  The validity of the assumption  that the coefficients  sum to  unity implied by this
formulation was confirmed by the significance of the error correction term in the regressions reported in
Table 4.- 46  -
private capital formation  is significantly negative as evidenced by  the cointegrating vectors in
Table 2.
As  with  the  previous  results,  the  unrestricted equations  indicate  the  importance of
government infrastructure investment and quantities of private credit, as well as a positive role
for  government  expenditure.  The  error  correction  term  is  significant  in  all  of  the
reparameterizations, lending support to the model hypothesized as well as to this formulation of
the error correction model.  The lagged private investment term is never significant although its
inclusion tends to  improve the diagnostic statistics.  As before, this may be because of lagged
variables that  had to  be omitted to  preserve degrees of freedom.  Equations 2 and  4 perform
particularly  well with significant coefficients and cointegration  tests  that  indicate white noise
errors.  Figure 6 plots the actual and fitted values for private investment using equation 2 from
Table 4.53  Once again, the model fits very well over the sample period.  The Chow tests for a
structural break in 1974 also indicate considerable paramneter  stability.  Like the previous results
from  the Engle-Granger procedure, the  parameter stability  implied by  the Chow tests  is  an
indication that  the consequences of the policy changes between the pre and post infitah periods
have been captured through the economic deterrninants on the right hand side of the regressions.
3.7.  An Evaluation  of the  Results
The best results from the Engle and Granger procedure are equation 2 in Table 3 and for
the generalized dynamic modelling  equation 2 in Table 4 perform particularly well. The diagnostic
tests from both procedures are not markedly different, nor are the coefficient estimates.  The plot
"Note that Figure 6 depicts private investment  in first differences.0.8  1 5 ApC\+  f
~O.A
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of actual and fitted values for the unrestricted version is a slightly better representation of the
data  than  that  from  the  Engle-Granger procedure.  Both estimates confirm  the core  model
hypothesized above which identified  the role  of  derand,  markups,  and  costs  in  investment
determination.  The long run multipliers in Table 2 reveal that  the accelerator has the largest
impact  on  private  capital  formation,  followed by  investment costs  and  the  markup.  The
cointegration tests indicate that  these best equations resulted in approximately stationary error
processes at the first stage and white noise errors in the second.
The two stage and  the unrestricted dynamic modelling provide strong evidence on the
crucial role of the quantity of credit.  The interpretation of this PVCRDY is as an indication of
rationing  in  credit  markets  where banks  face administered interest  rates and  have imperfect
information about borrowers.  In Egypt this was particularly problematic because of widespread
tax evasion.  As a consequence, banks often had to make decisions about loans without access to
the firm's true balance sheets.  Although government borrowing did not crowd out established
private sector firms who had access to abu;dant  amounts of credit,  there appears to  have been
some crowding  out  at  the  margin of  less established firms  and  perhaps  of  potential  firms.
Ultimately, this reflected weaknesses  in the financial system which operated with highly imperfect
information and in a climate of considerable uncertainty.
The more Keynesian ICOSTS  variable consistently outperformed the interest rate variables,
R and R/W.  This is because the ICOSTS variable takes into explicit account the interaction of
demand and supply in the capital goods market and includes the important distinction between
tradable and non-tradable capital goods, thereby providing a more realistic measure of the user
cost of capital.  The combination of the ICOSTS variable and PVCRDY provides a much better- 49  -
measure  of the cost of capital to the firm in a repressed financial system than the neoclassical
interest rate.
The insignificant effect of interest  rates on  investment has been a  common and  often
problematic finding in much empirical work in both  developed and  developing economies.  A
number of explanations have been proposed in the literature to explain why it is not  possible to
obtain a significant coefficient for the cost of funds when in theory the interest rate should be a
crucial  variable.  These include  uncertainty  about  internal  rates  of  return,  unsophisticated
investment decision procedures, the long time frarne of investment decisions compared to short
run  fluctuations  in  interest  rates,  and  the  possibility  that  changes in  borrowing  costs  are
overshadowed by variations in demand.54
In this model, the insignificance of the interest rate is justified by the existence  of markup
pricing,  the preference for  using internal  funds for  investment financing,"  and  the effects of
"financial repression."  In a rationed financial market, the allocation of credit has little to do with
the price of borrowing and  much more to  do  with the quantity.  In  the Egyptian case, the
existence of rationing did not imply that credit was in short supply since the banks were highly
liquid during much of the period.  Rat'er,  it meant that  what credit there was available was
allocated according to non-price criteria such as reputation.
54  See Hay and Morris, 1979,  pp. 393-394  for a discussion.
"  In addition to firms preferring  internal financing  of investment,  the banks avoid providing  funds
for longer  term activities because  they are not permitted  under Central Bank regulations  to charge  higher
interest rates on longer term loans.  Instcad, the banks prefer to roll over short term loans, which
obviously  adds grea:er uncertainty  for the firm.- 50  -
This is not  to imply that  the interest rate was not important, since its low level was a
crucial factor determining the tendency of firmns  to  become overindebted, as evidenced by the
frequent overleveraging among the  firms surveyed.  Rather,  it is  argued that  in  a  repressed
financial system, the  nterest ra e serves a different role than  that  of clearing the market  for
credit.  Specifically, the rcte  of interest  becomes a  mechanism whereby the government taxes
savers on behalf of itself and private sector borrowers.
Neither  modelling procedure  provided any  evidence of  crowding out  as  a  result  of
government policy.  None of the  government spending variables had  a  significantly negative
coefficient.  Equation 2 in Table 4 provides strong evidence of the positive effects of government
investment in infrastructure on private capital formation.  The long run coefficient on GVIINF
in equation 2 of Table 2 is also significantly positive.  This implies that infrastructure investment
is complementary  to private activity by reducing costs to firms and therefore induces higher levels
of private investment.
The error correction mechanism  is consistently significant, whether as the lagged residual
from the levels regression in the Engle and Granger procedure or as the lagged levels term in the
unrestricted estimates, thereby confirming its appropriateness as a representation of the data.  In
general, the error correction model seems to be an appropriate means of capturing the process by
which agents adapt to the highly complex environment in which investment decisions are made.
The plots  of the actual and  fitted values from the two procedures indicate that  the model has
strong predictive content.  Without having to rely on ad hoc dunmny  variables, it has been possible
to identify the underlying economic processes that determined private investment.- 51  -
Although  the above econometric analysis lends considerable support  to  the  mode' of
investment determination hypothesized, it also highlights the limits of this type of analysis and
the difficulties in assessing the impact of government policy.  In theory, by estimating the signs
and magnitudes of public policy multipliers it should be possible to respond to  the long-running
debate about crowding out versus crowding in.56  However, at the aggregate level, it is virtually
impossible to prove definitively whether crowding out or crowding in has occurred because of the
problem of constructing the counterfactual.
In order to prove that crowding out occurred, for example, it would be necessary to show
not only that  the public sector expanded while the private sector contracted, but  also that the
private sector sought to  expand and was displaced by the public sector.  It  would be easy to
conclude that  a negative multiplier on a governrment  policy variable implied crowding out when
in fact it may be reflecting a possibly wise countercyclical policy on the part of the state.  What
it is possible to conclude at the macroeconomic level, however, is what did  not happen.  For
example, a positive public policy multiplier is a fair indication that crowding out  did not occur
as is a negative multiplier a reasonable basis for concluding that crowding in did not occur.
The results above for Egypt provide mixed evidence  of crowding out at the macroeconomic
level.  The effects of government policy only operated through direct, non-price channels, such
as rationing in credit markets and government investmnent.  Indirect channels such as interest rates
5 Buiter concludes from his theoretical survey about crowding out versus crowding in that  ultimately
the question is an empirical one that must be addressed through the estimation of public policy multipliers.
Buiter, 1985.- 52  -
and  bond substitutability  were not  relevant.  This is a  particular  feature of the crowding out
versus crowding in debate in many developing countries.
The  government did  not  crowd  out  established  firms  in  the  credit  market  and,  by
maintaining artificially low interest rates, implicitly subsidized the borrowing of these firms.  At
the margin, however, the government may have crowded out newer borrowers and thus contributed
to a lower level of private investment. This may not have been a major economic loss since there
is evidence that the efficiency of much of the private investment that was made was very low.  On
the other hand, greater _ccess to credit for newer and smalier firms and the resulting competitive
pressures might have contributed to a more efficient use of investmnent  resources.
The economic results  also  lend some support to  crowding in as  a  result  of aggregate
government expenditure and, in particular, to government investment in infrastructure.  However,
the positive coefficient on GVIINF may bc reflecting a procyclical stance on the part of the state.
Whether the results are capturing causality or simply the coincidence of government spending
with private investment during a boom period is not clear.
4.  Conclusions
This  paper  has  attempted  to  address some of  the  weaknesses in  the  theoretical  and
empirical literature on investment.  By integrating the microfoundations and macroeconomics of
investment at the empirical level, it has been possible to provide a more realistic model of the
causes of capital  formation  in  a  developing economy.  Rather  than  simply hypothesizing a
theoretical model of the determinants of aggregate investment, the macroeconomic specification- 53  -
is based on  detailed case studies of firm decision-making.  Its  application  to  the  Egyptian
experience generated a number of different determinants of investment that might be considered
in other country case studies.
The nicrofoundations  revealed the complex channels through which government policy can
affect  private activity.  While it was not  possible to  test all of  the transmission mechanisms
empirically, the model provides a general framework for analyzing aspects that  are relevant to
particular economies.  The econometric approach taken to test the model addressed many of the
methodological weaknesses in  the existing literature  on  investment.  Thus,  for  example, the
common problem of "spurious correlations" in investment functions was addressed by testing the
time series for stationarity  and insuring that the residuals from the econometric estimation were
"white noise."
By using two different estimation techniques along with the microfoundations, the validity
of the model hypothesized was conf.rmed further.  The use of an error correction approach and
the application of unrestricted dynamic modelling allowed for some of the effects of expectations
and uncertainty on aggregate investment.  A comparison of the actual and estimated values for
private investment over the 1960-86  period revealed how well the model fit the data despite the
considerable shocks to the economy over the period.
The limits of econometric testing of whether the government "crowds in" or "crowds out"
private investment and the impossibility of constructing the counterfactual were also discussed.
While it is not possible to conclude whether crowding out or in occurred at the macroeconomic
level, i.e. to accept the alternative hypothesis, it is possible to draw conclusions about what did- 54-
not happen, i.e. to reject the null hypothesis.  In addition, the model provided a framework for
analyzing the effects of government policy by considering explicitly the role of a  number of
possible instruments such as 'he  exchange rate, the quantity  of credit available to  the private
sector, and the composition and financing of the government  budget.  Future research may choose
to test other empirical proxies, such as protection, within the same framework.
The model of investment behavior that emerged had features in common with a number
of different approaches in the literature  as well as aspects that  are particularly  relevant to  a
developing economy.  Firms'  decisions about  investment were outcomes of  the  oligopolistic
structure of markets, putty-clay technology, the inelastic supply of non-traded capital goods and
rinancial repression.  The consequences of these factors for  investment determination were an
important  role for  mark ups,  internal  financing, demand, and  the  cost  of  investment goods
defined, not as the interest rate,  but  as the price outcome from the interaction  of supply and
demand in the market for capital goods.
By constructing an index of the relative price of investment goods, it has been possible to
provide a  more meaningful indicator of the true cost of capital to  the firm under a  repressed
financial system.  In an economy with a well functioning credit market, the Keynesian  equilibrium
condition equating the marginal efficiency of investment with the interest rate is likely to hold.
However, under financial repression or where credit markets are imperfect, the interest rate is not
a  true reflection of  the cost of  capital  to  the firm.  Instead, a  combination  of the  price of
investment goods and the quantity of credit available to the private sector appears to be a more
realistic proxy.- 55  -
Further exteglsions  of the model have interesting implications for a range of stabilization
policies.  For  example, policies such as devaluation, credit ceilings and  reductions in public
investment, have negative effects on private capital  formation.  in  the context of protection,
putty-clay tochnology and inelastic demand for imports, the likely outcome of devaluation is a
reduction in investment, at least in the short run until efficiency gains are achieved. 5"  Similarly,
credit  ceilings imposed on  a  repressed financial system  are likely  to  result  in  a  worsening
allocation of resources since those who possess borrowing power are often different from those
whose projects have the highest returns.  The model also  provided evidence of the  potential
negative impact  of  fiscal  austerity  and  cuts  in  public  infrastructure  investment on  capital
formation in the private sector.
Some of the fall in investment that results from such stabilization policies may be desirable
if, for example, more efficient production results.  Howevet, the costs of this transition in factor
efficiency may be high because firms are locked into their technologica! choices for long periods.
An evaluation of the efficacy  of stabilization policies cannot occur in an institutional vacuum and
must take into account these differential effects of government policy over the short and long run.
The question of how government stabilization policy can facilitate this transition to more efficient
production could be an important extension of this research.
57 See Chhibber  and Shafik, 1990  for an analysis  of the impact  of devaluation  for private investment
in Indonesia  that cont asts the short versus  long run effects.- 56  -
Appendix  A: Data Sources  and Derivations
Sources of Data
The data used in the econometrics came from a variety of sources.  The sources are listed
below with the variable(s) obtained from them.  Note that when a variable is listed with more
than one source, this means that different parts of the time series came from different sources or
that series from a number of sources were cross referenced and reconciled.  Note also that a "N"
at the end of a variable's  acronym indicates its nominal value.  All indices use 1980 as the base
year (1980=100).
For  a  general discussion of the sources of economic data  in  Egypt, see the statistical
appendix in  Mabro and Radwan.5g  For a discussion of  the evolution of the measurement of
capital formation in Egypt, see Radwan.59  A more recent discussion of economic data in Egypt
is available in Hansen.
The sources used were the following:
Central Authority for Public Mobilization and Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
- consumer price index, disaggregated (CPI)
- wholesale price index, disaggregated (WPI)
- WPI  for domestic machinery (WPIDMACH)
- WPI for construction (WPIBLDG)
- WPI for transport equipment (WPITRANS)
- gross domestic product at factor costs (GDPN)
Central  Authority  for Public Mobilization and  Statistics,  Emplovment, Wages, and  Hours  of
Work, various issues (1968-78).
- number of workers in the private sector
58Mabro,  R. and S. Radwan, 1976,  pp. 242-265.
5  The commodity  flow approach used to measure  capital formation in Egypt  is based on data for
domestic  production, imports, and exports of capital goods. See  Radwan, 1974,  pp. 74-81.
0 Hansen, 1988.- 57  -
Commander, S., The State and Agricultural Development in Egypt since 1973, London: Ithaca
Press, 1987.
- average wages in agriculture (AVGWAG)
Ikramn,  K.  Egypt:  Economic  NManagement  in  a  Period  of Transition,  Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins
University Press, 1980.
- domestic bank financing of the government deficit (DBFGDN)
- government  expenditure  (GOVEX)
International  Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, *arious issues.
- domestic credit claims on the private sector (PRVCRDN)
- discount  rate,  end  of period  (DISCR)
- consumer  price  index (CPI)
- GDP  deflator  (GDPDEF)
- London interbank interest rate (LIBOR)
- world  wholesale  price  index  (WWPI)
International Monetary Fund, "Arab Republic of Egypt - Recent Economic  Developments,"  various
issues.
- private investment  (PRIVIN)
- government  investment  (GOVIN)
- government investment in infrastructure (GVIINFN)
- gross domestic product at factor prices (GDPN)
Mabro, R. and S. Radwan, The Industrialization of Egypt. 1939-73,  London, 1976.
- gross domestic product at factor prices (GDPN)
Ministry of Planning, "Follow-up Report to the Five Year Plan," (in Arabic), various issues.
- private  investment  (PRIVIN)
- government  investment  (GOVIND
Pick's, World Currency Yearbook, various issues.
- nominal parallel mnarket  price of foreign exchange (EBM)
Shura Council, "Investrnent Policy during the Period 1959/60-1982/83,"  Arab Republic of Egypt,
unpublished report, 1985 (in Arabic).- 58  -
- government investment by economic activity (GOVIN)
- private investment by econornic activity (PRIVIN) 61
- number of workers by economic activity (TOTLAB)
- wages by economic activity (TOTWAGN)
- final consumption at market prices by the public sector (GOVCONN)
- government investment in agriculture and irrigation (GVIAGN)
- governrent  investment in electricity (GVIELECN)
- government investment in construction (GVICONN)
- government investment in transportation  (GVITRNN)
- government investment in communications (GVICOMN)
- government investment in utilities (GVIUTILN)
- investment costs in machinery (ICMACHN)
- investment costs in buildings (ICBLDGN)
- investment costs in transport equipment (ICTRANSN)
- investment  costs  in other  (ICOTHERN)
- gross domestic product at factor costs disaggregated by economic activity
World Bank,  "Arao  Republic of  Egypt: Issues of Trade  Strategy and  Investment Planning,"
January  1983.
- gross domestic product at factor prices (GDPN)
- GDP from the petroleum sector (GDPPETRN)
- government  deficit  (GOVDEFN)
- domestic bank financing of the government deficit (DBFGDN)
- total  government tax revenue (GVTXRVN)
World  Bank,  "Arab  Republic  of  Egypt. Current  Economic Situation  and  Economic Reform
Program," July 1986.
- gross domestic product at factor prices (GDPN)
- GDP from the petroleum sector (GDPPETRN)
- government investment in infrastructure (GVIINFN)
World Bank, "Arab Republic of Egypt: Country Econormic  NMemorandum,"  September 1988.
- gross domestic product at factor prices (GDPN)
- GDP from the petroleum sector (GDPPETRN)
- government investment in infrastructure (GVIINFN)
- government  expenditure  (GOVEX)
61 The Shura  Council  data on private and government  investment  by economic  activity were  compared
with the figures  given  in various issues  of the Ministry  of Planmng's  Follow-up  Report to the Five Year
Plan.  The figures  were generally  consistent  and discrepancies  could usually  be explained  by differences
in definLitions  and categories  used.- 59  -
United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, various issues.
- indirect taxes (INDTAXN)
United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues.
- export price index for machinery and equipment from the major  industrialized  countries
(XUVKIMP)
Derivations
The derivations used for the variables included in the econometrics are as follows in alphabetical
order:
AVGWAG  =  TOTWAGN/TOTLAB
GDP  =  log(GDPNO)
GDPNO  =  (GDPN-GDPPETRN)/GDPDEF
GOVI  =  log[GOVIN/IDEF]
GVEX  =  log[GVEXN/GDPDEF]
DBFGD  =  log[DBFGD/DBFGD]
GVINFN  =  GVIAGN+GVIELECN+GVICONN+GVITRNN+GVIUTILN
GVIINF  =  log[GVINFN/IDEF]
ICOSTS  =  log[IDEF/GDPDEFI
ICTOTN  =  ICMACHN+ICBLDGN+ICTRANSN
IDEF  =  (0.194*WMACH*WP[DMACH)+(0.0806*WMACH*IMACfII)
+(WBLDG*WPIBLDG)+(WTRANS*WPITRANS)
+(WOTHER*WPI)
IMACHI  =  XUVKIMP*EBM
INDTAX  - INDTAXN/GDPDEF
KP  =  (1-0.043)KP(-I)+PRIVI
MARKUP  =  log[WPUWAGEINDX]
NIGVEX  =  GOVEX-GOVI
PRIVI  =  log[PRIVIN/IDEF]
PROFIT  =  log(GDPNO-TOTWAG-INDTAX)
PVCRD  =  log[PRVCREDN/GDPDEF]
PVCRDY  =  log[PRVCREDN/GDPDEF/GDPNO]
R  =  log( I+DISCRATE)/(1  +(WPI-WPI(-  1  ))/WPI(-  1))
R(W  W  log(1+R)/(1+AVGWAG)
TOTWAG  =  TOTWAGN/WPI
WBLDG  ICBLDGN/ICTOTN
WMACH  =  ICMACHN/ICTOTN
WOTHER  =  ICOTHERN/ICTOTN
WTRANS  =  ICTRANSN/ICTOTN- 60  -
The investment deflator  used above was constructed by using a weighted average of price indices
that constitute  investment costs.  Since the weights based on the Shura Council data  were only available
for  1961-82, the shares of investment costs were assuned  fixed before 1961 and after  1982."  The price
index for domestic capital goods was the WPI for machinery and equipment which only includes indigenous
capital goods.  The indices for construction and transport were also obtained from the disaggregated '  PI.
The WPI was not available in disaggregated form before 1977, therefore the aggregate WPI had to  be
used.  The only exception was the price index for  construction for which a series was available from
1970.63 A price index for machinery exports of the major industrial countnes  was used as an index of
imported  capital goods prices.  This was multiplied by the nominal parallel  market exchange rate  to
obtain an index of imported capital goods prices in Egypt.  The parallel market exchange rate was used
since it  was the  operative  rate  for  much of the period  and captures  the  opportunity  cost  of foreign
exchange for  the period of rationing  pnor  to  1974.  The relative shares of domestic versus imported
machinery is assumed to  be  fixed.  The weights are  based on  estimates  from the World  Bank that
imported machinery constitutes 80.6% of total machinery inputs.64  This is a fairly plausible figure given
the small size of the domestic capital goods industry and the fact that indigenous and imported machinery
are far from perfect substitutes.
The index of wages used to calculate the markup proxy is based on two sources.  For  1960-1981,
the series for average wages  in the economy calculated from the Shura Council was used.  However, after
1981,  data on aggregate wages  are scarce since the Central Authority for Public Mobilization and Statistics
is several years behind in compiling the labour force surveys.  Consequently, data on agricultural wages
was used for 1981-1986  to construct the wage index.61 This is not an implausible supposition since wages
in the agricultural sector are fairly market-determined and would represent a close approximation to wages
in the private sector.
62The weights used before 1961  were: machinery-0.35; building-0.41; transport-0.15; other-0.09.  The
weights used after  1982 were: machinery-0.40; building-0.38; transport-0.16; and other-0.05.
h3  Assaad constructs  a Paaschc index for labour, capital and  mnaterials  in the construction  sector.
Assaad, 1989.
"World  Bank, 1980.
6 eCommander,  1987, p. 92.- 6 1  -
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